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Abstract 
Do executives have fixed effects on firm-level stock price crash risk 
by 
Jiaxin Liu 
Adviser: Professor Joseph Weintrop 
This paper investigates whether individual CEOs and CFOs have “styles” (i.e. 
manager’s fixed effects) in withholding corporate bad news, which is captured using 
firm-level future stock price crash risks. Tracking managers that move across firms and 
employing a manager fixed-effect model, I find that both CFOs and CEOs have fixed 
effects on firm-level stock price crash risks in the future using multiple crash risk 
measures adopted from previous studies (e.g. Kim et al.(2011a,b)). In addition, I find 
that CFOs’ managerial ability is positively associated with one crash risk measure. 
Lastly, I find systematic differences in CEO vis-à-vis CFO’s preferences in exploiting 
voluntary disclosure, earnings management, tax avoidance and other channels to 
withhold bad (good) news which generates crash risks. And these preferences vary in 
accordance with managerial ability, age cohort group and gender of managers.  
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Do executives have fixed effects on firm-level stock price crash risk.  
1. Introduction:  
Studies on firm-specific stock price declines suggest that firm-level bad news withholding 
behaviors manifest into firm-specific accruals, tax avoidance and biased earnings guidance and 
are also associated with the likelihood of a future stock price crash (Kim, Li and Zhang ( 2011a, 
b), Kim and Zhang (2015), Hamm, Li and Ng (2014)). These studies, however, do not 
distinguish between the effects of manager- and firm-specific bad news withholding behaviors 
on stock price crash risks. This paper explores this issue by examining whether management 
fixed-effects exist in stock price crash risk. 
After the collapse of Enron and other high-profile companies in the early 2000s, as well as the 
recent financial crisis, a stream of research has investigated the cause of extreme price declines 
(e.g. Jin and Meyers (2006); Hutton, Marcus & Tehranian. (2009); Kim et al. (2011a,b)). 
Studies highlight the agency problem behind stock price crashes in which managers tend to 
hide the privately observed bad news from investors due to personal reputation and career 
concerns. They stockpile the bad news in current period until it reaches a tipping point in the 
next period where they are no longer able to hoard more bad news. Evidence shows a stock 
price crash when all of the negative   is released in the future period. 
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Managers with heterogeneous personal preferences of honesty, conservatism, risk-taking, and 
cognitive basis (i.e. knowledge of assumptions, alternatives and consequences of future events) 
exhibit different degrees of tolerance towards negative news and preferences for the timely 
release of the bad news. Therefore, it is expected that there exists a management-specific 
idiosyncratic component in stock price crash risk.  Prior studies seem to suggest such a link 
given the findings of manager fixed-effects in firms’ financial reporting opacity (Ge et al. 
(2011)), voluntary disclosure quality (Bamber et al. (2010)) and tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 
(2010)), as well as the evidence that stock price crashes are associated with firm-level financial 
reporting (Hutton et al. 2009; Hamm et al. 2014) and tax avoidance activities (Kim et al. 
(2011)).  
However, detecting a manager fixed-effect in stock crash risk is difficult for a few reasons. 
First, the neoclassical theory suggests that managers do not bear idiosyncratic decision-making 
power that affects organizational strategies because managers’ decisions are motivated and 
constrained by economic incentives in compensation contracts and by corporate governance 
mechanisms (Weintraub (2002); Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Thus, it is possible that 
managers are passively selected into the firm by the board of directors based on a profile of 
firm characteristics, e.g. organizational culture and goals.  Therefore, the variation in future 
stock performance may be completely predicted by firm-level characteristics with minimum 
influence from the manager.  
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Second, there may not be an association between individual manager and firm crash risks if the 
risk of concealing bad news attached to idiosyncratic managerial characteristics are anticipated 
and priced into firm valuation by investors before the news surprises arrive in the market. In a 
semi-efficient market, the market expectation is that some, if not all, observable demographic 
and personal information of managers (e.g. age, gender, educational and working background, 
religious beliefs, etc.) are factored into the discount rate in stock valuation, and thus we may 
not observe systematic differences in stock price movement among managers when bad news is 
released. 
Third, there may not be any incremental, manager-specific effects on firm crash risk if new 
managers release accumulated bad news in the initial year of their appointment. Pouraciau 
(1993) suggests that incoming executives tend to record large write-offs and special items that 
decrease earnings in the year they enter management and to increase earnings in the following 
year. Meanwhile, the departing executives tend to decrease earnings during their last year of 
tenure. Yu (2012 working paper) develops a model suggesting that the new CEO is likely to 
create a “big bath” at his or her initial appointment when the benefits of a lower risk-premium 
demanded by investors, that is associated with low earnings, outweighs the cost of a reduction 
in the CEO’s compensation value. Therefore, if the big-bath associated with the departing and 
the newly appointed managers has exhausted all bad news within the firm, we may not be able 
to detect an empirical association between individual managers and crash risk in the remaining 
tenure of the new manager as there is not sufficient bad news that can manifest into stock 
crashes in subsequent years. 
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4	
Taken together, it remains an empirical question whether individual manager’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics are associated with future firm-level crash risk. To examine whether managers 
carry their individual style of withholding bad (good) news and the associated impact on 
firm-level crash risk from one firm to another, I track managers who worked for multiple firms 
in the ExecuComp database for the sample period of 1992-2013. I identify 483 CFOs and 478 
CEOs that have consecutive employments with at least two firms and investigate for each firm 
whether the crash risks of the executives’ appointment period is significantly different from the 
crash risks in the period in which they are absent. The research design aims to delineate 
manager-specific effects on crash risk from the unobserved, firm-specific confounding factors 
and other time factors that are correlated with crash risk. In addition, I include firm-specific 
fixed-effects in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to further address this concern. 
Following prior studies, I use three crash risk measures (Kim et al.(2011a,b)). The first isthe 
discrete crash risk measure Crash1t+1, equals 1 if a firm-specific weekly return falls below 3.2 
standard deviations from its mean annual weekly return, and 0 otherwise. This measure 
captures the likelihood the firm experiences extreme stock return declines in a year. The second 
crash risk measure is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, 
capturing the downside risks of firms having extreme negative stock returns (Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2001)).  The third crash risk measure is the down-to-up return volatility ratio 
constructed by Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) that is an alternative measure of the negative 
skewness of stock returns but less subject to extreme outlier returns.  
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Applying these measures, I firstly find evidences that both CFO and CEO have fixed effects on 
firm crash risks, suggesting that they have idiosyncratic styles in withholding bad news. 
Secondly, having established the association between individual manager and firm-specific 
crash risk, I  examined the role observable managerial characteristics, such as managerial 
ability, age cohort and gender, play on this manager fixed effects. The “upper echelon theory” 
suggests that demographic managerial characteristics are associated with managers’ key 
formative experiences and managerial knowledge, and are a reflection of managers’ values and 
cognitive basis that shape their decisions and choices.  
I estimated the magnitude of individual manager’s fixed effect on firm crash risks. Following 
Bamber et al. (2010), I separated managers into pre- and post-World War II age cohort groups 
and into male/female gender groups to account for the differences in disclosure conservatism 
associated with these characteristics (Bamber et al.(2010)). In addition, I estimated the portion 
of managerial ability attributed to each switching manager (e.g. fixed managerial 
ability ,Demerjian et al. (2012)) to investigate its association with manager’s fixed effects on 
crash risks 
I find that CFO’s fixed ability is positively associated with their fixed effects on the third crash 
risk measure only, consistent with Tate and Malmendier (2008)’s finding that superstar 
managers are more likely to underperform in the future and tend to use earnings management to 
meet market expectations. I find no association between age cohort, gender of CFOs and CFOs’ 
fixed effects on crash risks. In addition, I find no association between CEO characteristics and 
their fixed effects on crash risks. 
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Lastly, I examined whether CFOs’ and CEOs’ fixed effects on crash risks are associated with 
their fixed effects on management, voluntary disclosures, tax avoidance and “other channels”. 
Bamber et al. (2010) estimated managers’ fixed effects on voluntary disclosure variables, such 
as earnings guidance frequency, guidance precisions and guidance bias. Following Bamber et al. 
(2010), I estimate managers’ fixed effects on crash risk and on firm policy variables, such as 
discretionary accruals, earnings guidance frequency and tax avoidance to capture their style in 
using these channels to withhold bad news. In addition, I estimated managers’ fixed effects a 
variable that measures the collection of bad news withholding channels other than earnings and 
tax related ones (denoted as “other channels” in the following discussions). My goal is to 
examine (1) whether managers’ styles in utilizing earnings management, voluntary disclosure, 
tax avoidance and other channels to withhold bad news are associated with managers’ fixed 
effects on crash risks , (2) whether this association varies in CFO v.s. CEO sample, and (3) 
whether this association varies within CFO (and CEO) sample with regards to different 
observable managerial characteristics, such as age cohort, gender and managerial ability. 
I find that there is an association between earnings management/other channels and managers’ 
fixed effects on crash risk in the CFO sample. Meanwhile, I observe an association between 
voluntary disclosures/other channels and crash risk in the CEO sample. This may suggest that 
CFOs and CEOs put different weight in utilizing earnings management and voluntary 
disclosure in bad new withholding as a result of different job focus and expertise.  
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In addition, these preferences vary respect to managerial ability, age cohort and gender of  
managers. For example, the association between earnings management/other channels and 
crash risks is more pronounced with high ability CFOs, male CFOs and CFOs born after WWII 
2 than their counterparts. Interestingly, the results appear to show that low ability CFOs may 
use tax avoidance in hoarding bad news. Similarly, I find that the association between 
voluntary disclosure/other channels and crash risks in the CEO sample are more concentrated 
with high ability, male CEOs and CEOs who were born after WWII. In addition, low ability 
CEOs appear to use only “other channels” in withholding bad news and CEOs born before 
WWII use both earnings management and “other channels” to hoard bad news. 
The findings of the paper show that CFO/CEOs have incremental influence (a.k.a.fixed effects), 
as a representation of their idiosyncratic characteristics, on future firm-level crash  risk after 
controlling for firm and year characteristics. CFO/CEOs’ observable characteristics, such as 
managerial ability and gender, are associated with their fixed effects on crash risks thus styles 
of withholding bad news. In addition, CFO/CEOs have different preferences in using earnings 
related, tax related and “other channels” in withholding news. 
 The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, this 
paper is the first in the crash risk literature to examine the determinants of crash from the 
dimension of corporate managers. Prior research focuses on the impact of firm-level 
characteristics (e.g. reporting opacity, accounting conservatism, executive’s equity incentives, 																																																								2 I advise caution in interpreting this result due to low test power associated with the small sample size of female CFOs and 
CFOs born before WWII.	
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tax avoidance strategy and management earnings forecasts) on corporate bad (good) news 
withholding/disclosure and crash risks in the future (e.g. Kim and Zhang (2015), Kim et al. 
(2010 a,b), Hutton et al. (2009), Hamm et al. (2014), etc.). This paper investigates the primary 
underlying causes of firm stock price crashes and the cross-sectional variation of these events 
in the market—the idiosyncratic characteristics of managers that determine firms’ decisions on 
withholding news and timing the disclosure of news. 
Second, there have been limited studies examining whether market perceives individual 
managers differently. Hayes and Schaefer (1997) suggest that the market has a negative 
reaction towards the departure of managers who are hired by another firm, implying investors 
do value manager’s ability. Pan, Wang and Weisback (2013 working paper) find that the 
market views the uncertainty associated with a CEO’s ability as risky, which is reflected in 
greater stock price volatility. Kim et al. (2014) find that overconfident CEOs are associated 
with greater stock price crash risk. In a semi-efficient market, we would not observe systematic 
differences in stock price crash events across managers if the market were able to distinguish 
managers’ withholding styles. My study is the first to provide indirect evidence on this issue, 
and suggest that market is not efficient in understanding manager’s news withholding and 
disclosure styles. 
Lastly, the findings of this paper could be of interest to the board of directors during the 
executive selection process. The selection committee may want to consider manager’s 
idiosyncratic, personal characteristics and consequential extreme stock price movements if they 
are concerned about extreme declines in value of their holdings of the company in the future. 
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The remainder of the paper is divided as follows: Section 2 is the literature and hypotheses 
development; Section 3 is the methodology and sample; Section 4 is the results; Section 5 
discuss the robustness test on board structure; Section 6 is a replication of Bamber, Jiang and 
Wang (2010); and Section 7 is the conclusion.  
2.  Literature review and hypotheses development: 
This study draws from two streams of literature: (1) research on managers’ fixed-effects and 
firm-level policies, and (2) research on managers’ bad news withholding and firm-level stock 
price crash risks. After reviewing each area in the subsequent sections, I join the two streams of 
literature to develop and present the main hypotheses. 
2.1 Managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics and fixed effects on firm policies: 
The “upper echelons theory” suggests that organizational outcomes, such as strategic choices 
and performance levels, are partially predicted by manager characteristics (Hambrick and 
Mason (1984). The authors propose that organizational strategic choices, in contrast to 
operational decisions, may reflect decision maker’s idiosyncratic characteristics, arising from 
“knowledge or assumptions about future events, knowledge of alternatives and consequences 
attached to each alternative” (pg.195). Following the “upper echelons theory”, several studies 
report empirical findings of manager’s fixed-effects on firm-level policies (Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang.(2011), Bamber et al. (2010), Dyreng et al. (2010)).  
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that individual managers have fixed effects on  firm-level 
financial policies (i.e. borrowing, cash holding, dividend payout, etc.), investment policies (i.e. 
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capital expenditure, acquisition, etc.), organizational policies (i.e. R&D, cost-cutting strategy, 
etc.), and firm performance (i.e. return on assets, etc.). For example, the paper finds that CEOs 
with MBA degrees take on more aggressive strategies than non-MBA CEOs, such as higher 
levels of capital expenditures, holding more debt and paying less dividends. 
Ge et al. (2011) find that individual CFO’s reporting style explains a significant portion of 
variation in firm’s earnings-related reporting characteristics, such as discretionary accruals, the 
probability of accounting manipulations and financial reporting conservatism. For example, the 
study finds that older CFOs are more conservative in earnings reporting than younger CFOs, 
which is evidenced by lower non-operating accruals and more timely disclosure of bad news.  
In addition, Bamber et al. (2010) document similar results that the CEO, CFO and general 
counsel of the firm have idiosyncratic influence on the firm’s voluntary disclosure 
characteristics, such as frequency, accuracy, precision and errors of management guidance.  
For example, executives with legal and military backgrounds appear to be more conservative 
and provide less good news forecasts than their counterparts, while executives with MBA 
degrees display more aggressive forecasting strategies by providing a greater number of both 
earnings forecasts and good news forecasts than non-MBA executives.  
This literature extends to tax reporting as well, where Dyreng et al. (2010) document that top 
executives have idiosyncratic influence on both the GAAP effective tax rate and cash effective 
tax rate of firms, suggesting that individual managers do exert incremental, fixed-effects on 
firm tax avoidance policy. 
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2.2 Bad news withholding and firm-specific crash risks 
Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009) show that managers withhold bad news and delay bad news  
disclosure out of reputational and career concerns. When managers conceal and accumulate bad 
news until it reaches a tipping point in next period, the bad news to be released suddenly to the 
market which causes an abrupt stock price decline, i.e. stock price crash (Jin and Meyers (2007); 
Hutton et al. (2009); Kim et al. (2011)). In addition, concealment of bad news also prevents 
investors and board of directors from discerning negative NPV projects from positive NPV 
projects on a timely basis. A stock price crash can occur when bad performance of the negative 
NPV projects accumulates and eventually materializes (Bleck and Liu (2007)). 
One way, managers can withhold bad news by manipulating financial statement information. 
Hutton et al. (2009) find that firm-level financial reporting transparency is negatively 
associated with firm-level crash risk. Kim and Zhang (2015) document that higher accounting 
conservatism deters bad news withholding and is negatively associated with firm crash risk. 
In another way, managers can camouflage bad news in their forecasted earnings, thereby 
issuing biased management forecast to guide market expectations. Hamm et al. (2014) find that 
higher management earnings forecast frequency is associated with higher crash risk, suggesting 
that managers use more frequent management guidance to conceal bad news and manipulate 
the disclosure of bad news. 
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Moreover, Kim, Li and Zhang (2011) find that tax avoidance activities enable managers to bury 
bad news in complicated tax-related transactions. The paper suggests that higher tax avoidance 
is associated with higher future firm crash risk. 
2.3. Managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics and firm-level crash risks 
It is widely suggested that managers can conceal and embed an extreme amount of bad news in 
financial statement information and management guidance through a variety of accounting and 
tax transactions that obfuscate firm’s financial reporting transparency. Thus, firm-level 
characteristics, such as discretionary accruals, earnings guidance frequency, effective tax rate 
and accounting conservatism, are used as indicators of the degree of bad news hoarding, and 
are associated with future firm-level crash risk (e.g. Kim et la. (2011)a,b; Kim and Zhang 
(2015); Hutton et al. (2009); Hamm et la. (2014), etc.).  
However, managerial bad news hoarding behaviors associated with negative operational and 
strategic events may not be fully captured by these firm-level characteristics, such as financial 
reporting opacity, voluntary disclosure policy and tax avoidance, documented in existing 
literature. For example, managers may choose to withhold and delay the announcement of a 
manufacturing glitch discovered in the current production period. The production glitch may 
increase the probability of future product recalls, resulting in lower future earnings. Another 
example is a cost overrun. Managers may conceal the additional cost, as well as the delayed 
deadline, from investors in the hope that future costs will drop and progress may recover in the 
future. Managers may choose to disclose the cost overrun only when the room of absorbing bad 
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news becomes less than minimal. Other examples include the potential departure of a key 
management member and the failure in negotiating a long-term contract with an incumbent 
outsourcing partner, distributor or supplier, all of which can adversely affect future firm 
performance. Managers may not choose financial statement or management guidance as 
vehicles to hide this bad news, and instead they may simply withhold, accumulate and carry the 
bad news into the future, leading to possible abrupt stock declines when a cluster of bad news is 
released in later periods. 
The “upper echelon theory” suggests that individual managers possess different sets of values 
and cognitive basis that determine their perceptions and decision-making processes and 
outcomes.  Given the same operational and strategic scenario, each manager can exercise 
discretion on the time, content and extent of bad news disclosure, resulting in different levels of 
bad news withholding and disclosure by each individual. It is reasonable to expect that 
managers associated with different personal values (e.g. honesty, conservatism and risk-taking 
preference), in conjunction with different cognitive basis (i.e. the knowledge of assumptions, 
alternatives and consequences of future events, Mason and Hamribrick (1984)), will exemplify 
varied degrees of bad (good) news tolerance and varied bad (good) news disclosure timeliness, 
which will manifest into the cross-sectional variation of future firm-level crash risk.  For 
example, it is possible that a manager who values honesty above personal gains and who is 
more conservative-oriented may choose to disclose bad news on a more timely basis, and thus 
be less prone to future crash risk than a manager who places a stronger emphasis on personal 
gain and has a more aggressive disclosure style. Natovich et al. (2011) show that IT project 
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managers with higher psychological capacity_ are able to disclose bad news on a more prompt 
basis without excessively considering the wellbeing of themselves than managers with lower 
psychological capacity. 
However, it is also possible that there is no association between idiosyncratic managerial 
characteristics and corporate news withholding behaviors (and associated stock price crash 
risks). 
Firstly, the neoclassical theory suggests that managers are “identical substitutes” and are 
homogenous, self-less inputs into the production process (Weintraub 2002). Agency theory 
focuses on governance monitoring mechanisms, such as independent boards and incentive 
contracting, on constraining manager’s choice of firm policies, being consistent with Hambrick 
(2007) argument that managerial influence limited to the decision power one possesses. 
Betrand and Schoar (2003) also point out the possibility that homogenous managers are 
passively chosen by boards based on a firm’s strategic needs which manifest into a persistent 
pattern of firm policies. Therefore, it is possible that the variation in firm-specific stock price 
crash is purely a manifestation of firm-level determinants, such as a specific strategy pursued 
by a firm in a particular life-cycle stage or the firm-level governance mechanisms that constrain 
managerial discretion in rent extraction.  In other words, the firm-level characteristics may 
co-move with management appointment and fully explain the timing and extent of firm’s bad 
news disclosure.  
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Secondly, stock price crash is a market behavior which cannot be easily predicted in the 
semi-strong form of market efficiency. Since much of manager-specific information (e.g. age, 
gender, educational and working background, religion, etc.) is readily available to the public 
via the internet, 10-K reports and media interviews, it is highly probable that market has 
observed such information, factored it into the crash likelihood and discounted the stock price 
beforehand. If that is the case, there should not be any statistically or economically significant 
manager fixed-effects on firm-level crashes.  
Thirdly, there may not be any incremental, manager-specific effect on firm crash risk if new 
managers always tend to release accumulated bad news in the initial year of their appointment. 
Pourciau (1993) suggests that incoming executives tend to record large write-offs and 
income-decreasing special items in the year they enter management and increase earnings in 
the following year. Meanwhile, the departing executives tend to decrease earnings during their 
last year of tenure. Yu (2012 working paper) develops a model suggesting that the new CEO is 
likely to create a “big bath” at his or her initial appointment when benefits of a lower 
risk-premium demanded by investors outweigh the cost of the CEO’s compensation value 
reduction. If the big-bath associated with the departing and the newly appointed manager has 
consumed the majority of bad news in the firm, we may not detect an association between the 
moving manager and crash risks in firm-years subsequent to her/his appointment because there 
is insufficient remaining bad news to generate crash incidences following the initial big-bath. 
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Therefore, it remains an empirical question whether individual managers have “style” in bad 
news withholding, illustrated in their idiosyncratic influence on firm-level crash risks. I 
examine the association between the individual chief executive officer (CEO) (and chief 
financial officer (CFO)) and firm-level crash risks with the following hypotheses: 
H10: There is no association between individual CFOs and future firm-level crash risk.  
H1a: There is an association between individual CFOs and future firm-level crash risk. 
H20: There is no association between individual CEOs and future firm-level crash risk. 
H2a: There is an association between individual CEOs and future firm-level crash risk. 
2.4 Managers’ observable characteristics and their fixed-effects on firm crash risks 
	
However, the Upper Echelon Theory suggests that the cross-sectional differences in managers’ 
demographic and personal characteristics shape their values and cognitive basis which in turn 
affect their managerial styles on firm policies (Hambrick and Mason (1984)). Empirical studies 
documented observable managers’ characteristics, such as age, gender, career background 
influence their financial reporting and voluntary disclosure strategies. For example, Ge et al. 
(2011) finds that older CFOs tend to have more conservative financial reporting styles, 
including lower non-operating accruals and incorporating bad news on a more timely manner 
than good news. In addition, Bamber et al. (2011) documented managers born before world war 
II are associated with less frequent earnings guidance, suggesting a conservative voluntary 
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disclosure styles by these managers which is consistent with the implied conservative values 
they obtained during the great depressions and war (Zemke (2000)). Tate and Malmendier 
(2008) suggests that superstar CEOs are more likely to be distracted from their work after 
winning award and to engage in earnings management to maintain market expectations.  
Therefore, I conjecture that managers’ personal characteristics, such as managerial ability, age 
and gender are associated with their preferences in withholding bad news, which is reflected in 
firm stock price crash risks. 
2.5 Managers’ preferences in exploiting different channels in withholding bad news  
 
Prior studies suggests that managers use earnings management, earnings guidance and tax 
avoidance to withhold bad news and thus these firm-level characteristics are associated with 
firm crash risk (Hutton et al. (2008), Kim et al(2011,a,b), Hamm et al.(2014)). In addition, 
managers may also have discretions to channels other than earnings management, earnings 
guidance and tax avoidance in withholding corporate bad (and good) news, such as 8-K 
disclosure and other media disclosure channels.  
 CEOs and CFOs have different expertise in managing the company. For example, CEOs are in 
charge of the setting out strategic plans for the company, such as acquiring a competitor or 
supplier, expanding production line or opening up new stores and setting sales and production 
goals for departments, as well as announcing them to public. While CFOs have highly 
specialized finance, accounting and compliance expertise, and thus are more involved in 
financial/accounting oriented activities, such as compiling books, tax planning and reporting 
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firm financial performance to CEOs. CEOs work involves heavy reliance on reported internal 
data to make strategic disclosures. Therefore, I conjecture that CEOs and CFOs prefer using 
certain channels to using others to carrying out bad news hoarding. For example, CFOs may be 
more engaged in earnings management and tax avoidance in concealing bad performance while 
CEOs may prefer using earnings guidance and “other channels”. 
Therefore, I conjecture that CEOs and CFOs have systematic preferences in using one or more 
channels to withhold bad news. 
3. Research Methodology and Sample: 
3.1. Sample and research model for managers fixed effects 
3.1.1. Sample 
I identified CEOs/CFOs who worked for at least two firms, denoting them as “Switching CFO” 
(“Switching CEO”).  To disentangle firm-level characteristics and other time-varying factors 
that may be correlated with the presence of individual switching managers and with firm crash 
risks. I match the switching managers to the matching managers, i.e. managers who worked in 
the same firm before and after the switching managers (Diagram 1). For example, in Diagram 1, 
a switching manager worked for firm A in period 2 and move to firm B in period 3. The 
switching manager is the manager of interest.  I track her/him from firm A to firm B. 
Matching Manager A1(B1) and A2(B2) are used as the control group of managers since these 
managers are subject to the same unobserved, firm-specific characteristics as the switching 
managers in each firm. 
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    I started with the CEOs and CFOs listed in the ExecuComp database in the period from 1992 
to 2013_. The initial sample consists of 6,754 CFOs and 6,898 CEOs.  I tracked CFOs/CEOs who 
worked for least two firms (i.e. switching CFOs/CEOs), and find there are 576 switching CFOs 
and 759 switching CEOs. I then merge the data with the CRSP database and as a result only 557 
switching CFOs and 680 switching CEOs remain due to missing returns observations in 
calculating crash risk measures. I further merge the data with Compustat which results in 483 
switching CFOs and 478 switching CEOs remaining due 
  
Diagram 1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Firm A
Matching 
Manager A1
Switcher
Firm B Matching Manager B1 Switcher 
Matching 
Manager B2
Matching Manager A2
Sample Selection Steps CFO CEO
Total
Observations-
CFO sample
Total
Observations-
CEO sample
 Sample period fiscal year 1992-2013
ExecuComp 6,754 6,898 29,891 37,386
Switching Managers 576 759 10,243 10,495
557 680 9,062 8,870
483 478 7,525 7,377
2. Identified switching CFOs/CEOs are managers that worked for at least two firms in the sample period.
Table 1 Sample Selection 
Data available for crash risk measures calculation on
CRSP
Data available for crash risk measures calculation on
Compustat
This table presents the sample selection procedures in constructing the sample for manager's fixed effect model:
1. CFO are identified by (1) extracting keywords from the "anntitle" field, including excerpts of "Chief Financial Officer, chief
finance officer, VP in Finance, vice president in finance, vp-finance, treasurer, comptroller", (2) using "cfoann" field indicator;
CEO are identified by (1) extracting keywords from the "anntitle" field, including excerpts of CEO, Chief Executive Officer,
(2) using "ceoann" field indicator.
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to missing financial data from Compustat in calculating the control variables. The estimation 
sample of CFO (CEO) is reduced to 7,525 (7,377) firm-year observations. 
3.1.2. Managers’ fixed-effects model: 
Following prior research (Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Bamber et al. (2010); Ge et al. (2010)), I 
use a manager fixed-effect model to analyze CFO’s and CEO’s idiosyncratic effect on firm 
future crash risk. To estimate managers’ fixed-effects on firm-level crash risks, I employ 
regression model (1) and (3) OLS regression3 (see below) for the CFO and CEO sample. I 
include an indicator variable for each switching manager, firm and year in the model. 
Regression model (2) and (4) are the restricted crash risk models that exclude fixed effects of 
CFOs’ and CEOs’. Prior studies document that CFOs may succumb to the CEOs’ pressure to 
manipulate earnings (Feng et al.(2010)). Thus, it is possible that the CFOs’ style of bad news 
withholding is a manifestation of the CEOs’ decision style. Therefore, for the CFOs’ fixed 
effect models (model (1) and (2)), I include an indicator variable for the current year CEO to 
delineate the CFO effect from the CEO effect.  
CFO Sample: 
Crash Risksj,t+1 = α + β1 CFO  Switching CFO Dummiesjt+ β2 Controlsj t +  
             β3 Firm fixed- effectjt+ β4 Year fixed-effectjt + β5 ConcurrentCEOjt + ɛjt  (1)                                    
  
Crash Risksj,t+ 1= α + β1 Controls jt + β2 Firm fixed-effectjt + β3 Year fixed-effectjt+ 
              β5 ConcurrentCEOjt + ɛ jt                                 (2) 																																																								3	 Model	(1)	–	(4)	are	estimated	using	the	command	“xtreg,fe	“in	Stata.I	am	aware	that	for	the	discrete	variable	Crash1	t+1,	STATA	does	not	converge	on	logit	so	I	use	OLS	to	obtain	proximated	results.	I	am	aware	that	this	may	cause	biased	estimation	in	the	coefficient	estimations	and	is	subject	to	future	refinement.		 	
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CEO Sample: 
Crash Risksj,t+1 = α + β1 CEO Switching CEO Dummiesjt + β2 Controlsjt +β3 Firm fixed-effectjt 
               + β4 Year fixed-effectjt + ɛjt                                (3)  
 
Crash Risksj,t+1 = α + β1 Controls jt + β2 Firm fixed-effect jt +β3 Year fixed-effect jt + ɛ jt  
(4) 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no fixed-effect of individual switching CFOs/CEOs on firm 
future crash risks. Thus, I use F-test to investigate whether the coefficients of individual 
switching CFOs/CEOs are jointly zero (i.e. Not all β1 CFO s = 0 and not all β1 CEO s = 0). If the 
F-statistic value are significant at <0.1 level for a crash risk measure, i.e. the coefficient of at 
least one switching manager is not zero, I can reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that 
individual switching CFOs/CEOs in my sample do exert idiosyncratic effects on the one-year 
ahead firm-level crash risk. In addition, I compare the change in the adjusted R2 of regression 
model (1) and (3) with the restricted regression model (2) and (4) to examine the incremental 
explanation power the switching CFOs and CEOs add to firm crash risks. 
3.1.3 Variable Definitions 
 Crash Risk Measures 
Crash Risksj,t+ 1 are the crash risk measures which capture the probability the firm experiences 
extreme stock price declines (increase) in the future, as adopted from prior studies (Kim et al. 
(2011a, 2011b), Hutton et al.(2009), Hamm et al.(2014), Kim and Zhang (2015)). Following 
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these studies, I construct crash risk measures using firm-specific weekly returns estimated from 
the following equation: 
r j,t= α +β1jr m, t-1+β2j rm,t+ β3j rm,t+1 + β4j ri,t-1+ β5j ri,t + β6j ri,t +1+ ɛji  .     (5) 
 r
j,t 
is the return on stock j in week t, r
m,t 
is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in week t, and ri,t is the Fama-French value-weighted industry returns in week t. I include 
the lead and lag terms for the market and industry index return to allow for nonsynchronous 
trading (Dimson 1979; Scholes and Williams 1977)). Specifically, the firm-specific weekly 
return for firm j in week t is Wjt = ln(1+ ɛji), the natural log of one plus the residual return from 
regression model (5). 
The first crash risk measure, Crash1j,t+1 , is an indicator variable equals to 1 if in a given fiscal 
firm-year, the firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (Wjt) decreasing 3.2 
or more standard deviations below (above) the annual mean firm-specific weekly return 
measured over the entire fiscal-year, and 0 otherwise. The second crash risk measure, 
Crash2j,t+1 is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific weekly returns developed by 
Chen, Hong and Stein (2001). It is calculated for a firm-year by taking the negative of the third 
moment of firm-specific weekly returns of the sample firm-year and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the year raised to the third power, as shown in 
the following equation:  
             Crash2j,t+1=-[n(n-1)3/2ƩW3 j,t+1]/[(n-1)(n-2)( ƩW2jt+1)3/2]         (6).  
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 23	
The third crash risk measure, Crash3j,t+1 , is defined as log of the ratio of the standard deviation 
of firm-specific weekly returns that are above the annual mean returns to the standard deviation 
of returns that are below the annual mean returns, capturing the relative volatility of 
firm-specific weekly returns of the “down weeks” to the “up weeks”.  
                 Crash3j,t+1= Log( σdown j,t+1 / σup j,t+1)                      (7) 
All crash risk measures are one-year ahead measures (i.e. year t+1) since it takes time for the 
bad news to accumulate in the current period and to be released in the next period when the 
tipping point is reached. I aim to capture the bad news withholding behaviors of managers 
rather than the “whistle blowing” behaviors. 
 Control variables 
I constructed control variables following Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. 
(2011). All financial variables are obtained from Compustat and return variables from CRSP. 
DTURN is the detrended share turnover, which is a proxy for investor heterogeneity, or the 
difference of opinions among investors. Firms with high stock turnovers are more likely to 
have stock price crashes in the future. The NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific 
stock returns in the prior year, capturing the potential persistence of the third moment of stock 
returns. sdW is the standard deviation of past firm-specific stock returns, controlling for the fact 
that more volatile stock is more prone to crash in the future. w is the average firm-specific 
weekly return over the past year, with higher past returns associated with a greater probability 
of crashing in the future (Chen et al. (2011)). I include the standard control variables for firm 
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size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), financial leverage (LEV), and return on assets (ROA) 
(Hutton et al. (2008)). In addition, DISACC is the modified Jones’ discretionary accruals, 
controlling for the financial reporting opacity of the firm. Hutton et al. (2008) find that firms 
can conceal bad news in manipulated earnings and financial reporting opacity is positively 
associated with stock crash risks in the future. 
3.2 Models for observable manager characteristics and managers’ fixed effects on crash 
risks: 
Following prior studies, I examine whether observable manager characteristics, such as 
managerial ability (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis and McVay (2012)), age cohort_ and gender 
(Bamber et al. (2010), Ge et al. (2011)) are associated with the magnitude of manager’s 
fixed-effects on firm’s future crash risk. The OLS model regression is as follows, with all 
variables winsorized at 1% and 99%: 
     λmt = α+γ1 MA_Coeffmt + γ2Age_Cohortmt + γ3 Gendermt + ɛmt.               (8) 
λmt are the coefficients of switching CFOs and CEOs from model (1) and (3), representing 
individual CFO’s/CEO’s fixed-effects on firm crash risk. MA_Coeffmt is manager’s fixed-effect 
on Demerjian et al. (2012)’s managerial ability score (i.e. fixed managerial ability), estimated 
using the OLS regression model (9) as follows.   
          MA_scorejt  4 = α+β1SwitcherDummiesjt+ β2Firmsjt+ ɛjt             (9) 																																																								4	MA_score	is	the	managerial	ability	measure	for	each	firm	developed	by	Demerjian	et	al.(2012),	obtained	from	their	website	http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html.	
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In regression (9), I regress the aggregate managerial ability (MA_scorejt) from Demerjian et al. 
(2012)_ on the switching manager dummies (SwitcherDummiesjt) to obtain MA_Coeffmt  (i.e. a 
manager’s fixed-effect on overall managerial ability). I also controlled for firm fixed effects 
since MA_scorejt developed by Demerjian et al.(2012) may contain unobserved firm-level noise. 
MA_Coeffmt   is the β1 estimated for each switching manager in regression (5), capturing the 
manager-specific contribution to general managerial ability. Age_Cohortmt is defined 1 if a 
manager is born before 1945 (World War II), and 0 otherwise. Gendermt is 1 if the manager is 
male and 0 if the manager is female. 
3.3 Models for managers’ preferences in exploiting different channels in withholding bad 
news 
Bamber et al. (2011) estimated managers’ fixed effects on firm voluntary disclosure variables 
(e.g. earnings forecast frequency, forecast precision and forecast bias, etc) as the coefficients of 
manager indicator variables in the manager fixed effects model to capture managers’ individual 
disclosure styles. Following Bamber et al. (2011), I estimated managers’ fixed effects on firm 
crash risks to capture their individual bad news withholding styles. In addition, I estimated 
managers’ fixed effects on earnings management, voluntary disclosure, tax avoidance and other 
channels in an attempt to capture their individual styles in these channels of bad news 
withholding. The goal is to examine whether different managers (i.e. CFO v.s. CEO) are 
associated with different bad news withholding channels to achieve overall bad news hoarding 
during their appointment tenures. More specifically, using crash risk as bad news withholding 
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measure, I examine whether managers’ fixed effects on crash risks are associated with their 
fixed effects on the above mentioned, four bad news withholding channels to different degrees 
in my CFO and CEO sample.  
For the sample switching CFOs and CEOs following previous studies, I estimated manager’s 
fixed effects on signed discretionary accruals from modified Jones model (Hutton et al. (2009)), 
number of annual earnings guidance (Hamm et al. (2014)) and GAAP and cash effective tax 
rate (Dyreng et al. (2010), Kim et al.(2011b)) to capture manager’s use of earnings 
management, voluntary disclosures and tax avoidance to manipulate market perception and 
conceal bad news. The fixed effects are coefficients, β1 obtained in regressing these firm-level 
policy variables on switching CFO/CEO dummies as illustrated in the following OLS 
regression model (10), after controlling for firm and year fixed effects: 
 
Firm policy variables5 =α+β1 Switching CEO/CEO dummies + firm fixed effects                                     
                      + year fixed effects +ε                      (10) In	addition,	 I	estimate	managers’	 fixed	effects	on	 the	portion	of	bad	news	withholding	that	is	not	captured	by	bad	news	withholding	channels	documented	by	existing	studies	(i.e.	earnings	management,	voluntary	disclosures	and	tax	avoidance).	In	order	to	obtain	the	portion	of	crash	risk	as	a	result	of	withholding	bad	news	using	channels	other	than	earnings	 management,	 voluntary	 disclosures	 and	 tax	 avoidance	 (referred	 as	 “other																																																									5	Firm	policy	variables	are	(1)	signed	discretionary	accruals	from	modified	Jones	model	(DISACCt);	(2)	Number	 	 of	earnings	guidance	per	year	(NumFt);	(3)	cash	and	GAAP	effective	tax	rate	(GAAP_ETRt	and	CASH_ETRt),	and	(4)	residual	crash	risk	(ɛjt) by re-estimating model (1) and (3) with the inclusion of controls for earnings management, earnings guidance 
and tax avoidance. Definitions	are	provided	in	appendix	A.	
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channels”	 hereafter),	 I	 re-estimated	 regression	 model	 (2)	 and	 (4)	 by	 plugging	 in	additional	control	variables	controlling	for	earnings	management	(signed	discretionary	accruals	 from	 modified	 Jones	 model	 (Dechow	 et	 al.(1995)),	 voluntary	 disclosures	(number	of	earnings	forecasts	per	year),	and	tax	avoidance	(effective	GAAP	tax	rate	and	cash	 tax	 rate).	 Then	 I	 calculated	 the	 residuals	 ɛjt	 from	 the	 regression	 for	 each	observation.	ɛjt	is	the	portion	of	crash	risks	that	is	not	explained	by	variables	in	existing	studies,	 including	 market,	 firm-level	 financial	 reporting,	 voluntary	 disclosure	 and	 tax	policies.	In	other	words,	after	controlling	for	all	variables	known	to	affect	crash	risk	and	managers’	 bad	 news	 withholding	 decisions	 documented	 by	 previous	 studies,	 the	residual	 crash	 risks	 ɛjt	 should	 have	 captured	 the	 portion	 of	 variation	 in	 crash	 risk	attributed	to	managers	exploiting	non-earnings,	non-tax	related	channels	in	withholding	bad	 news,	 such	 as	 through	 8-K	 report	 and	 other	 form	 of	 media	 release	 (i.e.	 other	channels).	 I	 denote	 the	 collection	 of	 such	 channel	 as	 “OtherChant”.	 To	 delineate	 fixed	effects	of	specific	CFO	and	CEO	on	“OtherChant”,	I	regressed	ɛjt	on	the	switching	CFO	and	CEO	 dummies	 and	 obtained	 the	 coefficients	 FE_mgrOthert	 as	 the	 proxy	 of	 manager’s	idiosyncratic	reliance	on	the	“other	channels”	to	withhold	news.	 	
  λm=α+β1FE_mgrEMm+β2FE_mgrVDm+β3FE_mgrGAAP_ETRm+ 
                  β4FE_mgrCASH_ETRm+β5FE_mgrOtherm+εm	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)6 
The main regression model in this section is model (11), examining managers’ preferences on 
																																																								6	 Following	Bamber	et	al.(201I	),	I	use	the	robust	regression	with	reweighted	least	squares	to	control	for	the	effects	of	outlier	observations	in	model	(11).	 	 	
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exploiting earnings management, earnings guidance, tax avoidance and other channels in 
withholding news. λmt is managers’ fixed effects on crash risks from model (8) above. 
FE_mgrEMm, FE_mgrVDm, FE_mgrGAAP_ETRm, FE_mgrCASH_ETRm and  
FE_mgrOtherChanm, are coefficients β1s from model (10) for each manager, denoting 
manager’s fixed effects on each firm policy variables. The focus of mine is to examine the 
coefficient β1 – β5 in regression model (11) for CFO and CEO sample and compare them across 
samples, providing insights on how differently CFO and CEO exploit bad news withholding 
channels that are associate with firm crash risks. 
In addition, I run the regression model (11) separately for CFOs/CEOs (1) with high and low 
ability (defined by MA_Coeff >0 vs. MA_Coeff <0) , (2) born before and after WWII and (3) 
of different genders. 
 
4. Results: 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
Table 2 presents the frequencies of sample firms experiencing stock price crashes over 
1993-2013 in Compustat and ExecuComp. On average, 17.68% of firm-years in Compustat 
experienced at least one stock price crashes in the sample period. Whereas firms in ExecuComp 
have on average 20.86% experiencing stock price crashes. The highest crash incidences occur 
around year 2008 according to both databases, consistent with the financial crisis occurred in 
2008. The comparison shows that roughly 30% of ExecuComp firms are included in Compustat 
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and firms in ExecuComp have slightly higher crash incidences than those in Compustat. This is 
comparable with Kim et al. (2011).  
 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the crash risk measures and control variables. To 
avoid double counting firm-years that appear both in the CFO and CEO sample, I pooled crash 
risks and control variables to present the descriptive statistics of them, resulting in 11,722 
observations in Table 2. Mean Crash1t+1 is 23.4% _, suggesting that on average 23.4% firm-years 
in the sample during fiscal year 1992-2013 experienced one or more firm-specific weekly stock 
fiscal year
Number of
firm-years
Number of
Crashes
% firm-years with
stock price
crashes fiscal year
Number of
firm-years
Number of
Crashes
% firm-
years with
stock price
1992 5,762 799 13.87% 1992 1,331 201 15.10%
1993 6,472 820 12.67% 1993 1,448 265 18.30%
1994 6,868 929 13.53% 1994 1,505 242 16.08%
1995 7,015 872 12.43% 1995 1,575 241 15.30%
1996 7,490 921 12.30% 1996 1,698 264 15.55%
1997 7,574 1,028 13.57% 1997 1,751 276 15.76%
1998 7,321 1,307 17.85% 1998 1,782 357 20.03%
1999 7,188 1,000 13.91% 1999 1,712 293 17.11%
2000 6,961 1,035 14.87% 2000 1,624 295 18.17%
2001 6,425 1,224 19.05% 2001 1,653 372 22.50%
2002 6,121 1,441 23.54% 2002 1,681 464 27.60%
2003 5,932 1,094 18.44% 2003 1,730 379 21.91%
2004 5,928 1,202 20.28% 2004 1,682 397 23.60%
2005 5,894 1,132 19.21% 2005 1,589 383 24.10%
2006 5,824 1,151 19.76% 2006 1,736 413 23.79%
2007 5,730 1,223 21.34% 2007 1,921 405 21.08%
2008 5,455 1,599 29.31% 2008 1,875 519 27.68%
2009 5,267 1,042 19.78% 2009 1,840 371 20.16%
2010 5,188 881 16.98% 2010 1,824 332 18.20%
2011 5,128 1,064 20.75% 2011 1,790 420 23.46%
2012 5,041 1,197 23.75% 2012 1,752 452 25.80%
2013 4,960 999 20.14% 2013 1,715 421 24.55%
Total 135,544 23960 17.68% Total 37,214 7762 20.86%
Compustat Universe ExecuComp Universe
Table 2 Yearly frequencies of stock price crash events during 1992-2013
This table presents the descriptive statsitics of stock price crash events for firm sample in Compustat and ExecuComp during fiscal year
1992 and 2013. Definition of crashes is in Appendix A.
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price crashes. The mean negative coefficients of stock return skewness (Crash2t+1) is 0.169 
with a standard deviation of 1.060. Mean Crash3t+1 is 0.004.  
 
4.2 Results on managers’ fixed effects on crash risk: 
Table 4a and 4b tabulate the results of regression model (1) – (4) (managers’ fixed effects on 
crash risk and restricted models excluding fixed effects of managers).  
For the CFO sample, after controlling for the concurrent CEOs, firm and year effects, the F-test 
on switching CFO dummies returns a F-statistics of 1.14 with p-value equals to 0.0241 for the 
Crash1t+1, model (F-stat=1.30 with p-value of 0.000 for Crash2t+1, F-stat=1.26 with p-value of 
0.000 for Crash3t+1), suggesting that individual CFOs do exhibit idiosyncratic style in bad news 
withholding that affects firm-level crash risks.  
Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
Crash1t+1 11,722 0.234 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Crash2t+1 11,722 0.169 1.060 -1.398 -0.477 0.111 0.743 1.957
Crash3t+1 11,722 0.004 0.390 -0.613 -0.248 -0.011 0.239 0.655
DTURNt 11,722 0.006 0.117 -0.129 -0.024 0.004 0.033 0.143
Crash2t 11,722 0.154 1.030 -1.355 -0.485 0.090 0.715 1.901
sdWt 11,722 0.052 0.029 0.021 0.032 0.045 0.002 0.010
MeanWt 11,722 -0.002 0.008 -0.015 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.010
Sizet 11,722 7.473 1.579 5.002 6.407 7.410 8.521 10.134
MBt 11,722 3.539 58.852 0.656 1.442 2.205 3.590 9.300
LEVt 11,722 0.191 0.185 0.000 0.037 0.169 0.293 0.484
DISACCt 11,722 -0.005 0.116 -0.156 -0.044 -0.003 0.040 0.144
ROAt+1 11,722 0.046 0.130 -0.127 0.015 0.049 0.094 0.197
Table3 Descriptive Statistics (CEO and CFO sample combined) 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of crash risk measures and control variables in manager's fixed effect model.
1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level both sides.
2. This table presents descriptive statistics for dependent and independnet variables for the combined CFO and CEO
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I also examine the relative change in the R2s_ between the restricted and the full models. As 
shown in Table 4a, the R2 in the full model (model (1)) increased relative to the R2 in the 
Crash1t+1 Crash2t+1 Crash3t+1
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (1))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model(2))
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (1))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model(2))
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (1))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model(2))
Testing Economic
Determinatns = 0
F-statistics 10.51*** 9.34*** 48.80*** 43.01*** 35.05*** 30.77***
p value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Testing Manager Fixed
Effect = 0
   Switching CFO
F-statistics 1.14** 1.30*** 1.30***
p value 0.0241 0.0000 0.0000
   Concurrent CEO controls
F-statistics 1.17*** 1.15*** 1.31*** 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.24***
p value 0.0009 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 24.16% 17.08% 29.23% 21.76% 28.39% 20.81%
Improvement in R2
relative to restricted
model
In Raw Percentage 7.08% 7.47% 7.58%
As a % of restricted model R2 41.48% 34.33% 36.40%
Table 4a  Testing CFO fixed effect on future crash risk, controlling firm CEO fixed effect
n= 7,525 , SwitchingCFOs=483, Controlling CEOs=906
1.This table presents the results from model (1) and (2) on Crash1t+1 and  Crash2t+1 . I report the F-statisitc of testing the whether coefficeints of the
economic determinants are jointly zero, and whether the coefficients of switching CFO dummies are jointly zero for hypothesis1.  A p-value of the
f-test smaller than 0.1 suggests that the CFO dummies are not jointly zero, i.e. individual CFO having idiosyncratic effect on firm's crash risk in the
future.
3. I use the "xtreg, fe" command in Stata for all tests. Since Stata is not able to converge for the sample under the "xtlogit, fe" regression command
because quasi-seperation problem, I use the OLS alternative to approximate for the coefficients. However, I am aware that this could potential bias my
coefficeint estimates and this is subject to future refinement.
4. I have calculated R squared for both the full model (model (1)) and the restricted model (model (2)) and take the difference to examine the
incremental explanatory power that switching CFOs add to the crash risk models. "As a % of restricted model R-square" is calculated as (R2 of full
model  - R2 of restricted model)/R2 of restricted model .
5. Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 and <0.01 is denoted as *, ** and ***.
2. Definitions of variables in the model can be found in AppendixA.
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restricted model (model (2)), suggesting that switching CFOs do adds to the crash risk model 
and display idiosyncratic fixed-effects on firm crash risks8. 
For the CEO sample, I find that individual CEOs are associated with all of the crash risk 
measures. In Table 4b, the F-statistic for Crash1jt+1 1.18 and is significant with a p-value of 
0.0059 (F-statistic is 1.14 for Crash2jt+1 with a p-value of 0.0212; F-statistic is 1.27 for Crash3jt+1 
with a p-value of 0.0001). The adjusted R2 of the full model of Crash1jt+1 has increased by 15.52% 
relative to the restricted model, suggesting that individual CEO’s idiosyncratic characteristics 
exert influence on the probability of a firm’s future stock price crash. Similarly, R2 in the full 
model (model (3)) increased significantly after the inclusion of switching CEOs, suggesting 
that switching CEOs do have incremental effects on firm crash risks.     
In sum, I find evidence that both CFOs and CEOs have idiosyncratic styles in withholding bad 
news, which is evidenced by their fixed effects on firm-level future stock price crash risk. 
 
 
																																																								8	 Note that controlling for firm fixed-effects in the crash risk model reduces the adjusted R2 to negative. Past literature on 
crash risks did not include controls for firm fixed-effects (e.g. Hutton et al. (2009), Hamm et al. (2014); Kim and Zhang (2015), 
Kim et al. (2011), etc.). The adjusted R2 s are between 3%-8% in those models. Untabulated results show that, without 
controlling for the firm fixed-effect, I achieve the adjusted R2 in a similar range (3%-5%) which is comparable to prior studies. 
Due to the nature of manager fixed effects model (e.g. Bamber et al(2010), Ge et al.(2010)) that is designed to disentangle 
unobserved firm characteristics from switching managers’ fixed effects, firm fixed effects needs to be included to address this 
concern. I calculated the change in adjusted R2 after including switching CFOs. Untabulated results show that the adjusted R2 
increased after including CFOs, suggesting switching CFOs do have incremental effects on crash risks, in addition to firm 
characteristics. 	
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4.3 Results on managers’ observable characteristics and firm crash risk: 
Table 5a and 5b present the results of regression model (4), which examines the association 
between manager’s effect on firm future crash risk and observable manager characteristics such 
as gender, age cohort (born before or after World War II) and fixed managerial ability. 
Crash1t+1 Crash2t+1 Crash3t+1
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (3))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model (4))
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (3))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model (4))
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect t+1
(model (3))
Economic
determinant
t+1 only
(model (4))
Testing Economic
Determinatns = 0
F-statistics 9.70 *** 7.79 *** 43.37 *** 40.82 *** 6.57 *** 7.54 ***
p value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Testing Manager Fixed
Effect = 0
F-statistics 1.18 *** 1.14 ** 1.27 ***
p value 0.0059 0.0212 0.0001
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
 R2 10.21% 1.83% 14.02% 5.57% 13.71% 4.97%
Improvement in R2
relative to restricted
model
In Raw Percentage 8.38% 8.45% 8.75%
As a % of restricted model R2 456.76% 151.66% 276.14%
5. Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 and <0.01 is denoted as *, ** and ***.
4. I have calculated the adjusted R-sqaure for both the full model (3) and the restricted model (4) and take the difference to examine the incremental
explanatory power that switching CEOs add to the crash risk models. "As a % of restricted model R-square" is calculated as (Adj.R2 of full model (3) -
Adj.R2 of restricted model (4))/Adj.R2 of restricted model (4) .
n= 7,377, Switching CEOs=478, Firm= 679
2. Definitions of variables in the model can be found in AppendixA.
Table 4b  Testing CEO fixed effect on future crash risk, controlling firm CEO fixed effect
1.This table presents the results from model (3) and (4) on Crash1t+1 and  Crash2t+1 . I report the F-statisitc of testing the whether coefficeints of the
economic determinants are jointly zero, and whether the coefficients of switching CEO dummies are jointly zero for hypothesis1.  A p-value of the f-
test smaller than 0.1 suggests that the CEO dummies are not jointly zero, i.e. individual CEO having idiosyncratic effect on firm's crash risk in the
future.
3. I use the "xtreg, fe" command in Stata for all tests. Since Stata is not able to converge for the sample under the "xtlogit, fe" regression command
because quasi-seperation problem, I use the OLS alternative to approximate for the coefficients. However, I am aware that this could potential bias my
coefficeint estimates and this is subject to future refinement.
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Table 5a presents the results for the CFO sample. Panel A shows the distribution of CFOs’ 
fixed effect on the crash risk measures. Approximately 10-14% of the sample CFOs have fixed 
effects significant at p<0.1 level on firm crash risk. The mean fixed effect of an individual CFO 
on Crash1jt+1 (Crash2 jt+1, Crash3 jt+1) is 0.057 (0.185, 0.037), suggesting that the sample CEOs, 
on average, have fixed effects that increases the stock return crash likelihood of the firms they 
work for by 5.7% compared with the matching managers who worked for the same firms. Panel 
B shows the distribution of gender, age and fixed managerial ability of managers in the sample. 
Due to data availability of the managerial score adopted from Demerjian et al.(2014), there are 
only 436 CFOs remained in this test that examines the association between managers’ fixed 
effects and observable manager characteristics. In the table, about 91.8% of CFOs are male and 
4.8% CFOs are born before World War II. On average, these CFOs have a fixed managerial 
ability of -0.007. 
Panel C presents the results of regression model (4) for the CFO sample. I find evidences that 
CFO’s fixed ability is positively associated with only Crash3t+1. I find no evidence on the 
association between manager age cohort and gender and managers’ fixed effects on crash risk. 
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Table 5a CFO's Fixed Effects on Crash Risks and Manager age, gender and fixed ability
Panel A Distribution of CFO fixed effects on Crash(Jump) Risks n=483
Number of
CEO fixed
effects
significant at
10%
% of sample
having
significant
fixed effects Mean Standard Dev 25% Median 75%
Crash1t+1 52 10.77% 0.057 0.850 -0.870 0.419 0.797
Crash2t+1 69 14.29% 0.185 0.185 -1.774 1.133 1.965
Crash3t+1 68 14.08% 0.037 0.837 -0.688 0.376 0.772
Panel B Descriptive statistics of CFO Characteristics
n Mean Standard Dev 25% Median 75%
Gendert 436 0.918 0.275 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age_Cohortt 436 0.048 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000
MA_Coefft 436 -0.007 0.089 -0.047 -0.007 0.039
n=436 CFO
Crash1t+1 Coeff t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft 0.288 1.35 0.178
Gendert 0.048 0.69 0.493
Age_Cohortt -0.011 -0.12 0.902
Constant -0.041 -0.60 0.546
Crash2t+1 Coeff t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft 0.731 1.38 0.167
Gendert 0.174 1.00 0.316
Age_Cohortt -0.010 -0.04 0.965
Constant -0.160 -0.96 0.338
Crash3t+1 Coeff t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft 0.443 ** 2.27 0.024
Gendert 0.043 0.67 0.503
Age_Cohortt 0.008 0.10 0.923
Constant -0.036 -0.58 0.561
1. Panel A of Table 5a prestents the distribution of manager's fixed effect on crash(jump) risk measures. The fixed
effects are measured using coefficients of switching CFO dummies estimated in model (3-1)
2. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of fixed managerial ability, age and gender for the switching CFO
sample in the test in PanelD.
3. Panel C shows result of regression model (4) that examines if CFO's fixed effect on ability, their age and gender
are associated with the magnitude of their fixed effect on crash risk measures. I use robust regression to account
for effects of extreme outliers on the association. I report two-tailed t-test statistic to examine if there is an
association between managerial ability, manager gender and age cohort and their fixed effects on crash risk.
4. Significantce level is denoted as *, ** and *** for 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Panel C CFO fixed effects on Crash risks and CFO Characteristics
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Panel C presents the results of regression model (4) for the CFO sample. I find evidences that 
CFO’s fixed ability is positively associated with only Crash3t+1. I find no evidence on the 
association between manager age cohort and gender and managers’ fixed effects on crash risk. 
Table 5b presents the results for the CEO sample. Panel A shows the distribution of CEOs’ 
fixed-effects on crash risks. Approximately 12%-14% of the sample of CEOs have fixed effects 
smaller than 0.1 level on crash risk measures. The mean fixed effect of individual CEOs on 
Crash1jt+1 (Crash%jt+1, Crash2 jt+1, Crash3 jt+1) is 0.006 (-0.065, -0.110 and 0.224 respectively). 
The numbers suggest that the sample CEOs, on average, have fixed effects on the firms they 
work for that increases the stock return crash likelihood by 0.6%.  
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics. Due to availability of the 
MA_score measure, number of CEOs in sample is reduced to 418 to carry out the test in model 
(5). Approximately 98% of these CEOs are male while 24.2% of them are born before World 
War II. Average fixed ability of these CEOs is -0.012. 
Panel D presents the results of the regression model (4) for the CEO sample. I do not find any 
association between CEO fixed ability and firm crash risks, nor any association between CEO 
gender, age and crash risks.    
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Table 5b CEO Fixed Effects on Crash Risks and CEO age, gender and fixed ability
Panel A Distribution of CEO fixed effects on Crash(Jump) Risksn=478
Number of
CEO fixed
effects
significant at
10%
% of sample
having
significant
fixed effects Mean Standard Dev 25% Median 75%
Crash1t+1 65 13.60% 0.006 0.670 -0.621 0.331 0.573
Crash2t+1 62 12.97% -0.065 1.686 -1.324 -0.859 1.484
Crash3t+1 57 11.92% -0.110 0.639 -0.661 -0.391 0.481
Panel B Descriptive statistics of CEO Characteristics
n Mean Standard Dev 25% Median 75%
Gendert 418 0.978 0.145 1.000 1.000 1.000
Age_Cohortt 418 0.242 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000
MA_Coefft 418 -0.012 0.091 -0.050 -0.009 0.031
n=418
Crash1t+1 Coefficients t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft 0.137 0.77 0.442
Gendert 0.041 0.37 0.713
Age_Cohortt 0.038 1.01 0.312
Constant -0.078 -0.71 0.481
Crash2t+1 Coefficients t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft 0.034 0.08 0.936
Gendert -0.004 -0.01 0.988
Age_Cohortt -0.006 -0.06 0.950
Constant -0.024 -0.09 0.927
Crash3t+1 Coefficients t-stat p-value
MA_Coefft -0.068 -0.41 0.681
Gendert 0.035 0.34 0.731
Age_Cohortt -0.002 -0.05 0.963
Constant -0.042 -0.41 0.683
1. Panel A of Table 5b prestents the distribution of manager's fixed effect on crash risk measures. The fixed effects
are measured using coefficients of switching CFO dummies estimated in model (3-1)2. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of fixed anagerial ability, age and gender for the switching CEO
sample in the test in PanelD.
3.Panel C shows result of regression model (4).  I use robust regression to account for effects of extreme outliers on
the association. I report two-tailed t-statistic to examine whether manager ability, age and gender are associated with
managers' fixed effect on crash risk.
4. Significantce level is denoted as *, ** and *** for 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Panel C CEO fixed effects on Crash risks and CEO Characteristics
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In sum, I find some evidence that CFOs’ fixed managerial ability is associated with firm stock 
price crash risks in the future. While CEOs’ fixed managerial ability is not associated with firm 
crash risks.  
4.4 Managers’ exploitation of earnings management, management forecast and tax 
avoidance to withhold bad news : 
 
Table 6a presents the results for the CFO sample (for Panel A-D in Table 6a, see below). First, 
in Panel A, I find that the association between managers’ fixed effects on earnings management 
and their fixed effects on crash risk is more pronounced for CFOs. This is reflected in the 
significant coefficient of FE_mgrEMt (p<0.01) across all three crash risk measures. Similarly, 
the association between CFOs’ fixed effects on “other channels” and fixed effects on crash risk 
is also more pronounced for the CFO sample, evident with the significant coefficient on 
FE_mgrOthert on all crash risk measures. 
  Second, interestingly, the association between CFOs’ fixed effects on bad news withholding 
channels and their fixed effects on crash risks changes when I partition the sample into (1) high 
and low ability CFOs, (2) CFOs born before and after WWII groups and (3) male and female 
(Panel B, C and D). 
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PanelA    CFO's use of channels of withhodling bad news - overall
n=314
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.530 ** 2.71 0.007
FE_mgrVDt 0.000 0.04 0.968
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.121 -0.85 0.396
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.115 -0.82 0.410
FE_mgr_Other 0.288 *** 5.51 0.000
Constant 0.004 0.19 0.849
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 1.774 *** 3.55 0.000
FE_mgrVDt -0.005 -0.27 0.790
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.084 0.23 0.817
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.282 -0.79 0.430
FE_mgr_Other 0.157 *** 3.64 0.000
Constant 0.010 0.19 0.850
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.523 *** 2.88 0.004
FE_mgrVDt -0.001 -0.23 0.822
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.039 -0.29 0.768
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.014 -0.11 0.915
FE_mgr_Other 0.279 *** 5.77 0.000
Constant 0.005 0.28 0.783
4. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
Table 6a    CFO's use of channels to withold bad  news and manager fixed effects on crash risk
3. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust
regression to control for outliers in dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
2. Four news-withholding channels are earnings management (FE_mgrEMt), voluntary disclosures
(FE_mgrVDt), tax avoidance (FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt and FE_mgrCASH_ETRt) and “other channels”
(FE_mgrOthert). FE_mgrEMt, FE_mgrVDt, FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt, FE_mgrCASH_ETRt and
FE_mgrOthert are coefficients estimation of β1 that measures manager’s fixed effects on each firm
policy variable: DISACCt, NumEGt, GAAP_ETRt/CASH_ETRt and OtherChant from Model (6).
Definitions are provided in Appendix A.
1. This table presents the results for Model (7) for the CFO sample, illustrating CFOs’ preferences in
using different channels to withhold bad (good) news and the association between CFOs fixed effects
on crash risks and their fixed effects on various channels.
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Mgr Fixed Ability<0    n=161 Mgr Fixed Ability>0   n=153
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.425 1.43 0.155 FE_mgrEMt 0.516 * 1.95 0.054
FE_mgrVDt 0.014 1.42 0.158 FE_mgrVDt -0.009 -0.98 0.330
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.379 ** -2.16 0.032 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.227 0.90 0.369
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.011 0.06 0.952 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.313 -1.40 0.163
FE_mgr_Other 0.260 *** 3.71 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.350 *** 4.26 0.000
Constant -0.007 -0.23 0.820 Constant 0.025 0.86 0.391
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 2.487 *** 3.58 0.000 FE_mgrEMt 1.979 *** 2.70 0.008
FE_mgrVDt 0.009 0.39 0.697 FE_mgrVDt -0.033 -1.34 0.183
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.302 -0.74 0.463 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.678 0.98 0.327
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.746 * -1.72 0.087 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.079 -0.13 0.897
FE_mgr_Other 0.074 1.40 0.165 FE_mgr_Other 0.279 *** 3.89 0.000
Constant 0.036 0.50 0.616 Constant 0.037 0.47 0.639
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.809 *** 3.13 0.002 FE_mgrEMt 0.573 ** 2.23 0.027
FE_mgrVDt 0.003 0.37 0.709 FE_mgrVDt -0.011 -1.21 0.227
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.239 -1.56 0.120 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.287 1.17 0.243
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.296 * -1.83 0.068 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.151 0.70 0.483
FE_mgr_Other 0.226 *** 3.64 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.366 *** 4.90 0.000
Constant -0.010 -0.37 0.711 Constant 0.026 0.95 0.345
Table 6a    CFO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash risk (Cont'd)
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CFO sample into high and low ability group. High ability CFOs are CFOs with a
positive contribution to firm’s managerial ability, i.e. MA_Coefft>0. Low ability CFOs are CFOs with a negative contribution to
firm’s managerial ability, i.e. MA_Coefft<0.
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to control for outliers in
dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
PanelB   By managerial ability groups
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Table 6a    CFO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash risk (Cont'd)
Panel C   By Age Cohort Groups
 Age_Cohort=1  n=14  Age_Cohort=0  n=299
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -1.791 -1.55 0.160 FE_mgrEMt 0.456 ** 2.27 0.024
FE_mgrVDt 0.043 1.44 0.187 FE_mgrVDt -0.001 -0.10 0.921
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.634 -0.94 0.373 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.082 -0.57 0.572
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.646 -0.88 0.404 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.046 -0.32 0.746
FE_mgr_Other 0.112 0.59 0.570 FE_mgr_Other 0.291 *** 5.47 0.000
Constant -0.051 -0.71 0.497 Constant 0.004 0.18 0.855
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.776 -0.43 0.675 FE_mgrEMt 1.672 *** 3.23 0.001
FE_mgrVDt -0.012 -0.19 0.852 FE_mgrVDt -0.009 -0.52 0.602
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 2.665 2.06 0.073 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.251 0.67 0.505
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -4.634 *** -3.70 0.006 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.188 -0.52 0.604
FE_mgr_Other -0.017 -0.14 0.892 FE_mgr_Other 0.166 *** 3.77 0.000
Constant 0.083 0.69 0.507 Constant -0.004 -0.08 0.937
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.883 -1.24 0.251 FE_mgrEMt 0.478 ** 2.55 0.011
FE_mgrVDt -0.001 -0.04 0.972 FE_mgrVDt -0.003 -0.40 0.689
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.749 1.59 0.151 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.019 0.14 0.889
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -1.145 ** -2.43 0.041 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.010 0.08 0.938
FE_mgr_Other 0.001 0.00 0.997 FE_mgr_Other 0.286 *** 5.85 0.000
Constant 0.049 1.07 0.318 Constant 0.000 -0.02 0.983
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CFO sample into CFOs born before (Age_Cohort=1) and after (Age_Cohort=0)
World War II (WWII).
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to control for outliers in
dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. 3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 42	
 
In specific, results on the association between earnings management/other channels and crash 
risks are more consistent across three crash risk measures for high ability CFOs (Panel B). 
However, I do not observe the same association for low ability CFOs for the first and second 
crash risk measures. Meanwhile, there is evidence that low ability CFOs’ tax avoidance 
strategy is associated with their fixed effects on crash risk (p<0.05 on FE_mgrGAAP_ETR for 
Crash1t+1, p<0.1 for FE_mgrCASH_ETR for Crash2t+1 and Crash3t+1).. Panel C of Table 6a 
shows that the association between CFOs’ fixed effects on crash risk is more pronounced for 
CFOs born after WWII, while there is some evidence that tax avoidance (FE_mgrCASH_ETR) 
Table 6a    CFO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash risk (Cont'd)
Panel D By Gender Groups
Gender=Male   n=292 Gender=Female  n=22
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.522 *** 2.62 0.009 FE_mgrEMt 6.108 ** 2.44 0.027
FE_mgrVDt 0.000 -0.05 0.961 FE_mgrVDt 0.063 1.29 0.216
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.169 -1.11 0.266 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 1.851 * 1.75 0.098
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.047 -0.31 0.755 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.939 -1.35 0.197
FE_mgr_Other 0.285 *** 5.26 0.000 FE_mgr_Other -0.336 -0.97 0.348
Constant 0.009 0.40 0.691 Constant -0.133 -1.36 0.193
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 1.733 *** 3.47 0.001 FE_mgrEMt 6.326 1.00 0.331
FE_mgrVDt 0.001 0.06 0.952 FE_mgrVDt -0.044 -0.28 0.787
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.073 0.19 0.848 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 1.495 0.58 0.571
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.238 -0.63 0.530 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -1.198 -0.61 0.554
FE_mgr_Other 0.169 *** 3.80 0.000 FE_mgr_Other -0.108 -0.40 0.692
Constant 0.054 1.00 0.319 Constant -0.547 *** -2.02 0.060
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.489 *** 2.68 0.008 FE_mgrEMt 2.772 1.24 0.233
FE_mgrVDt 0.000 0.01 0.994 FE_mgrVDt -0.014 -0.25 0.809
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.040 -0.29 0.773 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.887 0.92 0.370
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.006 -0.05 0.963 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.083 -0.12 0.908
FE_mgr_Other 0.294 *** 5.89 0.000 FE_mgr_Other -0.096 -0.32 0.754
Constant 0.016 0.80 0.427 Constant -0.146 -1.57 0.137
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to control for outliers in
dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CFO sample into male (Gender=1) and female CFOs (Gender=0).
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is negatively associated with crash risk (for the second and third crash risk measures only) for 
CFOs born before WWII. Panel D of Table 6a shows that the result on the association between 
earnings management/other channels and crash risk for CFOs is more consistent (on all three 
crash risk measures) for male CFOs than female CFOs. But I take caution in interpreting the 
results of Panel C and D since the subsamples in respective tests are highly unbalanced. I have 
a small sample for CFOs born before WWII (n=14) and female CFOs (n=22). This potentially 
reduces the test power and the validity of results. 
Table 6b presents the results for the CEO sample (for Panel A-d of Table 6b, see below). First, 
Panel A shows that there is an association between CEOs’ fixed effects on voluntary 
disclosure/other channels and their fixed effects on crash risk. This is evident in the significant 
t- statistic for the coefficient of FE_mgrVDt and FE_mgrOthert (p<0.01).  
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PanelA    CEO's use of channels of withhodling bad news - overall
n=259
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.278 -1.37 0.171
FE_mgrVDt 0.013 *** 2.84 0.005
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.016 -0.16 0.870
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.093 0.98 0.330
FE_mgr_Other 0.540 *** 12.96 0.000
Constant 0.023 1.61 0.108
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.583 -1.01 0.315
FE_mgrVDt 0.045 *** 3.49 0.001
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.191 0.67 0.501
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.011 0.04 0.969
FE_mgr_Other 0.209 *** 5.37 0.000
Constant 0.027 0.68 0.500
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.215 -1.06 0.288
FE_mgrVDt 0.013 *** 2.94 0.004
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.107 1.09 0.278
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.011 0.11 0.910
FE_mgr_Other 0.426 *** 9.38 0.000
Constant 0.016 1.13 0.258
4. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
Table 6b    CEO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash risk
1. This table presents the results for Model (7) for the CEO sample, illustrating CEOs’ preferences in using
different channels to withhold bad news and the association between CEOs fixed effects on crash risks and
their fixed effects on various channels.
2. Four news-withholding channels are earnings management (FE_mgrEMt), voluntary disclosures
(FE_mgrVDt), tax avoidance (FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt and FE_mgrCASH_ETRt) and “other channels”
(FE_mgrOthert). FE_mgrEMt, FE_mgrVDt, FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt, FE_mgrCASH_ETRt and
FE_mgrOthert are coefficients estimation of β1 that measures manager’s fixed effects on each firm policy
variable: DISACCt, NumEGt, GAAP_ETRt/CASH_ETRt and OtherChant from Model (6). Definitions are
provided in Appendix A.
3. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression
to control for outliers in dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
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Mgr Fixed Ability<0      n=119 Mgr Fixed Ability>0    n=139
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.666 ** -2.07 0.040 FE_mgrEMt -0.040 -0.11 0.912
FE_mgrVDt 0.007 1.12 0.267 FE_mgrVDt 0.022 *** 3.63 0.000
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.012 0.08 0.937 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.128 -0.99 0.325
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.119 0.88 0.380 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.175 1.27 0.208
FE_mgr_Other 0.460 *** 7.16 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.644 *** 11.82 0.000
Constant 0.011 0.52 0.605 Constant 0.045 ** 2.49 0.014
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.473 -0.69 0.489 FE_mgrEMt -0.598 -0.58 0.564
FE_mgrVDt 0.025 1.39 0.167 FE_mgrVDt 0.074 *** 4.18 0.000
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.023 -0.05 0.957 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.321 0.86 0.390
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.190 -0.51 0.612 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.655 * 1.67 0.098
FE_mgr_Other 0.110 * 1.87 0.064 FE_mgr_Other 0.312 *** 6.25 0.000
Constant 0.051 0.88 0.381 Constant 0.061 1.18 0.240
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.158 -0.65 0.514 FE_mgrEMt -0.249 -0.66 0.511
FE_mgrVDt 0.007 1.09 0.280 FE_mgrVDt 0.021 *** 3.25 0.001
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.012 0.08 0.937 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.165 1.22 0.224
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.042 -0.32 0.752 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.208 1.45 0.151
FE_mgr_Other 0.370 *** 5.24 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.474 *** 7.86 0.000
Constant 0.007 0.32 0.746 Constant 0.037 * 1.96 0.052
Table 6b    CEO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash  risk (Cont'd)
PanelB   By managerial ability groups
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CEO sample into high and low ability group. High ability CFOs are CFOs with a positive
contribution to firm’s managerial ability, i.e. MA_Coefft>0. Low ability CEOs are CEOs with a negative contribution to firm’s managerial
ability, i.e. MA_Coefft<0.
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to control for outliers in
dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
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Panel C   By Age Cohort Groups
 Age_Cohort=1  n=50  Age_Cohort=0  n=209
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.741 * 1.99 0.053 FE_mgrEMt -0.509 * -1.83 0.069
FE_mgrVDt 0.023 * 1.78 0.081 FE_mgrVDt 0.011 ** 2.29 0.023
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.285 -1.00 0.321 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.035 -0.32 0.748
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.475 * 1.83 0.074 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.056 0.55 0.582
FE_mgr_Other 0.369 *** 3.22 0.002 FE_mgr_Other 0.593 *** 13.00 0.000
Constant 0.087 ** 2.30 0.026 Constant 0.009 0.59 0.556
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 2.314 ** 2.43 0.019 FE_mgrEMt -1.266 -1.56 0.120
FE_mgrVDt -0.004 -0.15 0.882 FE_mgrVDt 0.049 *** 3.46 0.001
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.366 0.58 0.562 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.025 -0.08 0.937
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.646 -1.08 0.286 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.109 0.37 0.714
FE_mgr_Other 0.382 *** 4.73 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.218 *** 4.83 0.000
Constant 0.312 *** 3.37 0.002 Constant 0.009 0.20 0.845
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt 0.743 ** 2.19 0.033 FE_mgrEMt -0.564 ** -2.04 0.042
FE_mgrVDt -0.012 -1.05 0.299 FE_mgrVDt 0.015 *** 3.19 0.002
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.241 0.97 0.336 FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.033 0.30 0.766
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt -0.068 -0.29 0.775 FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.019 0.19 0.852
FE_mgr_Other 0.472 *** 4.42 0.000 FE_mgr_Other 0.439 *** 8.81 0.000
Constant 0.093 ** 2.69 0.010 Constant 0.012 0.78 0.435
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to control for outliers in
dependent and independent variables (Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and ***.
Table 6b   CEO's use of channels to withold bad news and manager fixed effects on crash risk (Cont'd)
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CEO sample into CEOs born before (Age_Cohort=1) and after (Age_Cohort=0) World
War II (WWII).
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Second, the above mentioned association change when we partition CEOs into (1) CEOs with 
high and low ability and (2) CEOs born before and after WWII9. As shown in Panel B and C , 																																																								9	 I	also	looked	at	the	partition	based	on	CEO	gender.	However,	my	female	CEO	sample	has	a	sample	size	of	7,	which	is	way	too	small	to	estimate	a	robust	regression	model	with	five	predictor	variables.	The	estimated	coefficients	would	be	severely	biased.	So	I	leave	the	female	CEO	sample	out	of	the	test	and	examines	the	association	between	managers’	fixed	effects	on	different	firm	policies	and	fixed	effects	on	crash	risk	only	for	male	CEOs.	The	next	step	of	the	paper	include	
Panel D By Gender Groups
Gender=Male   n=252
FE_Crash1t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.298 -1.48 0.141
FE_mgrVDt 0.012 ** 2.58 0.010
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt -0.024 -0.24 0.811
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.095 1.00 0.319
FE_mgr_Other 0.536 *** 12.83 0.000
Constant 0.023 * 1.66 0.098
FE_Crash2t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.606 -1.03 0.302
FE_mgrVDt 0.043 *** 3.27 0.001
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.164 0.56 0.574
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.012 0.04 0.967
FE_mgr_Other 0.205 *** 5.18 0.000
Constant 0.026 0.65 0.517
FE_Crash3t+1 Coeff t p
FE_mgrEMt -0.223 -1.10 0.274
FE_mgrVDt 0.013 *** 2.72 0.007
FE_mgrGAAP_ETRt 0.108 1.08 0.283
FE_mgrCASH_ETRt 0.007 0.08 0.940
FE_mgr_Other 0.428 *** 9.25 0.000
Constant 0.017 1.20 0.232
1. This table repeats Model (7) by partitioning the CEO sample into
male (Gender=1) and female CEOs (Gender=0).
2. t-statistic and two-tailed p-values adjusted for
heteroscedasticity are presented. I use the robust regression to
control for outliers in dependent and independent variables
(Bamber et al.(2010)).
3. Significance level at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 is denoted by *, ** and
***.
Table 6b    CEO's use of channels to withold bad news and
manager fixed effects on crash risk (Cont'd)
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the association is primarily driven by the high ability CEOs and CEOs who are born after 
WWII (p<0.05). Low ability CEOs’ fixed effects on crash risk are positively associated only 
with their fixed effects on other channels (Panel B). While there seems to be evidence in Panel 
C suggesting that for CEOs born before WWII, their fixed effects on earnings management, in 
addition to other channels, is associated with their fixed effects on crash risks. This may 
suggest that CEOs rely on both earnings management and voluntary disclosure to withhold bad 
news, and that low and high ability CEOs may have different preferences on using each. Panel 
D shows for male CEOs, the association between managers’ fixed effects on voluntary 
disclosures/other channels and their fixed effects on crash risks are consistent across three crash 
risk measures. However, I take caution in interpreting the results of Panel C since the CEOs 
born before WWII is associated with a small sample size of 50 only.  
5. Robustness test on board structure:  
Andreou, Antoniou, Horton and Louca (2015) investigated whether corporate governance, 
including ownership structure, accounting quality, board structure and managerial incentives. 
After controlling for firm fixed effects, the authors find that outside board of directors’ 
shareholdings is positively associated with crash risk (coefficient of the negative skewness of 
stock returns and down-to-up volatility ratio), while board size is marginally, negatively 
associated with crash risk (p<0.1).  
Since the board of directors are heavily involved in the selection and monitoring of executives, 
it is possible that board characteristics are endogenous to managers’. Thus, I included board 																																																																																																																																																																																hand-collecting	female	CEO	and	firm	characteristics	to	enhance	the	sample	size	to	a	level	in	which	robust	regression	model	coefficients	could	be	estimated	without	severe	bias.	
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size and board independence in regression model (1)-(3) to see if they increase the explanatory 
power of the crash risk models, with or without managers’ fixed effects.  
Untabuulated results show that neither variables add to the adjusted R2 of the crash risk models 
in my sample, suggesting that my results on managers’ fixed effects should not be subject to 
the endogeneity associated with board structure. However, the results are subject to future 
robustness check when board member stock onwership is considered. I recognize this 
constraint to the findings of the paper and will include board stock ownership as additional 
control as the next step of this study. 
6.  Sensitivity test – replication of Bamber et al. (2010): 
I replicated Table 2 “Testing Individual Top Managers’ Fixed Effects on the Number of 
Management Earnings Forecasts” of Bamber et al. (2010) using my switching CEO/CFO 
sample. The replication has two purposes: (1) ensuring the identification of switching managers 
and the relevant sample selection procedures are correct; and (2) ensuring that my Stata coding 
and regression techniques are consistent with Bamber et al.’s model.  
Following Bamber et al. (2010), I use the regression model (12) and (13) shown below to 
replicate their findings on the association between CFOs/CEOs and earnings guidance 
frequency, substituting the dependent variable by using the number of earnings forecasts a firm 
issues per year and using standard control variables from the management guidance literature. 
All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
NumFj, t+1= α + β1 Controls jt + β2 Firm fixed-effect + β3 Year fixed-effect + ɛ jt     (12) 
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NumFj, t+1= α + β1  SwitchingCFO/CEO_Dummiesjt+ β2 Controls jt + β3 Firm fixed-effect  
         +  β4 Year fixed-effect + ɛjt                                   (13)                                                                                                                                                              
Bamber et al. used a sample period of 1995-2005 while my sample period is 1992-2013, 
resulting in a larger sample size compared to their study. Management earnings forecasts are 
obtained from the Company Issued Guidance database (CIG). Control variables are constructed 
from observations in IBES and Compustat. Results are presented in Appendix B as below. 
Table B1 presents the sample selection process. The final estimation sample consists of 325 
switching CFOs (2,897 firm-year observations) and 283 switching CEOs (2,546 firm-year 
observations) whose fixed effects are estimable.  
Table B2 is the descriptive statistics of the main and control variables. On average, the sample 
firms issue 4.971 management forecasts in a sample-year, which is relatively larger than 
Bamber et al.’s sample average of 1.77. I further looked at annual forecasts and quarterly 
forecasts separately, and the average number of annual forecasts is 2.815 and quarterly 
forecasts 2.156, which is closer to Bamber et al.’s sample average. The mean, median and 
standard deviation of other variables are comparable to Bamber et al.’s sample. 
Table B3 presents the results of managers’ fixed-effects on management earnings forecast 
frequency. In general, I find that there is an association between individual CFO/CEO and 
management earnings forecast frequency. It shows that CEOs and CFOs have an incremental, 
fixed-effect on the frequency of annual earnings forecast with an F-statistic of 1.64 (1.97) that 
is significant at the <0.000 level for the sample CFOs (CEOs).  
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Table B4 is the original table in (Bamber et al. (2010)), the results of which are comparable to 
my results_. 
7. Conclusion: 
Past theory and evidence suggests that individual managers bring idiosyncratic managerial 
styles to the firms in which they work and such styles affect firm-level policies on multiple 
levels (e.g. Hambrick and Mason (1984); Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bamber et al. (2010) and 
Ge et al. (2011)). I investigate whether managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics exert influence 
on firm-level bad news withholding decisions, reflected in the future stock price crash risks of 
the firm. 
Following prior literature and using the ExecuComp database, I track managers who switched 
firms in a sample period of 1992 to 2013 and examine whether these managers’ idiosyncratic 
styles affect firm stock price crash risks. Following Hutton et al. (2009) and related studies, I 
use the stock price crash incidences, the negative skewness of stock return distribution and the 
down-to-up returns volatility ratio constructed based on year t+1 firm-specific weekly returns 
to capture firm’s stock price crash likelihood in the future. 
Using the manager’s fixed effects model in Bamber et al.(2010), I managed to delineate 
managers’ effects on firm from firm- and time-specific factors by controlling for firm and time 
fixed effects in the model. There are 483 switching CFOs and 478 switching CEOs whose fixed 
effects are estimable in my final sample. I find evidences that both CFOs and CEOs have fixed 
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 52	
effects on firm crash risks, suggesting that they have idiosyncratic styles in withholding bad 
news. 
Secondly, building on prior studies on manager personal and demographic characteristics and 
their impact on firm-level policies (Baik et al. (2010), Demerjian et al. (2012), Get et al. (2011), 
Bamber et al. (2010)), I examine whether fixed managerial ability, age cohort and gender are 
associated with the magnitude of manager’s fixed effects on crash risk. The findings show that 
CFOs’ fixed managerial ability is positively  associated with their idiosyncratic impact on 
only the third crash risk measure. This is consistent with the notion that more able managers 
tend to be overconfident about future outcomes and are more likely to withhold bad news (Kim 
et al. (2015), Hamm et al. 2014, Kim and Zhang (2015)). One explanation is that the market 
underestimates the likelihood of “superstar CFOs” to shirk and manipulate earnings (Tate and 
Malmendier (2008)) to conceal bad news and meet market expectations. However, lacking of 
evidence on the first and second crash risk measure cautious the interpretation of the results 
here. I find no association between age cohort (and gender) of CFOs nor CEOs and their impact 
on crash risks. 
Lastly, I examined whether CFOs’ and CEOs’ fixed effects on crash risks are associated with 
certain channels of withholding bad news, such as earnings management, voluntary disclosure 
(e.g earnings guidance), tax avoidance and channels other than the earnings related and tax 
related channels (referred as “other channels”). I find that for my CFO sample, earnings 
management and other channels are associated with CFOs’ fixed effects on crash risks. And 
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this association is concentrated in the high ability CFOs, CFOs born after WWII and male 
CFOs. There is also evidence on all crash risk measures that low ability CFOs may use tax 
avoidance with withhold bad news while I observe no association between channels other than 
tax and crash risk for these CFOs. In addition, I find that voluntary disclosure and other 
channels are associated with crash risks and this association is concentrated in the high ability 
CEOs, CEOs born before WWII and male CEOs. While  
with and find that overall, CFOs and CEOs have different preference in using earnings 
management, voluntary disclosures, tax avoidance and “other channels” to withhold bad news. 
In specific, CFOs appear to favor earnings management and “other channels” in hoarding bad 
news while CEO resort to voluntary disclosure as well as “other channels”. In addition, these 
preferences vary respect to high v.s. low managerial ability, age cohort and gender of the 
managers. For example, the association between earnings management/other channels and 
crash risks are more pronounced in high ability CFOs while there are some evidences that low 
ability CFOs may use tax avoidance in hoarding bad news. The effects of earnings management 
and “other channels” on crash risks are also more pronounced for male CFOs and CFOs born 
after WWII than their counterparts. But I advise caution in interpreting this result due to low 
test power associated with the small sample size of female CFOs and CFOs born before WWII. 
In addition, I find that the association between voluntary disclosure/other channels and crash 
risks are more concentrated in high ability, male CEOs and CEOs who were born after WWII. 
While low ability CEOs appear to use only “other channels” in withholding bad news. 
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Interestingly, for CEOs born before WWII, there are evidences that they use earnings 
management instead of earnings guidance, besides “other channels”, to hoard bad news. 
This paper, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to examine individual managers and the 
effect of their idiosyncratic managerial style on firm’s future extreme stock price declines (and 
increases). It contributes to the crash risk and manager fixed effects literatures in the following 
ways. 
First, while prior studies show that firm-level accounting and tax characteristics are predictors 
of future stock crash incidence (Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2011a,b), Hamm et al.(2014)), 
I directly investigate the association between crash risks and managers ,who are the ultimate 
decision-makers of withholding and disclosing of corporate news. More importantly, my study 
managed to identify managers’ preferences in using specific channels, e.g. earnings-related, tax 
and “other channels”, to hoard bad news. 
In addition, my paper finds that market is not efficient in reading CEO/CFO’s disclosure style 
in predicting firm value, either due to unavailability of information on managerial 
characteristics or incomplete digestion of publicly available information such as age cohort, 
gender and managerial ability.  
Lastly, my study has controlled for firm fixed-effects in the crash risk model while previous 
crash literature did not. Thus the findings of CEO and CFO fixed effects on firm crash risks are 
robust to the endogenous unobservable firm characteristics.  
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One implication of this paper is to warrant investors and board of directors to take caution in 
assessing managers behavioral pattern of withholding news while working for previous 
employers, provided that the stakeholders are concerned with extreme stock price movements 
in the future 
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Crash Risk Measures
Firm-Specific-Weekly Return (Wt+1)
Crash1t+1
Crash2t+1
Crash3t+1
 Control variables for Crash Risk Model
DTURNt+1
NSKEWt 
SdWt
Rett
Sizet is the log of total asset.
MBt
LEVt
ROAt+1
DISACCt
GAAP_ETRt
CASH_ETRt
Variables for Earnings Forecast Model
NumFt
NumForcannt
NumForcqt
Sizet
Leveraget
Abs_EPSChgt
ROAt
Growtht is the sales growth from year t-1 to year t.
OpCFt is the cashflow from opeartion deflated by total assets.
EPS_UPt equals 1 if firm's EPS in this is greater or equal to its EPS last year, 0 otherwise.
MBt is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity.
RDxpt is the expenditures on research and development scaled by total asset.
Num_Analystt is the number of analyst following the firm.
DispForecast
F-horizont
is the forecast horizon, defined as the number of days between the forecast date and the end of the fiscal period
of forecasted earnings. I scaled forecast horizon by 360 days for annual and 90 for quarterly forecast.
is the number of earnings forecast management issued per fiscal-year (including both annual and quarterly
forecasts).
is the number of annual earnings forecast management issued per fiscal-year.
is the number of quarterly earnings forecast management issued per fiscal-year.
is the log of total asset.
is the total long-term debts divided by total assets.
is the absolute value of the change in firm's eranings per share from year t-1 to t, deflated by stock price at the
is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity.
is the total long-term debts divided by total assets.
is the future return on asset, return on asset is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged
asset.
is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged asset.
  stand rd deviation of analys s' forecasts  firm's arnings, devided by the absolut  value of the median
the financial accounting effective tax rate, defined as total income tax expense (TXT) divided by pre-tax
book income (PI) before special items (SPI).
the cash effective tax rate, defined as cash tax paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax book income (PI) before
special items (SPI);
is the signed discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated
from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., (1995)).
Appendix A  Variable Definitions
  is equal to ln(1+ɛ), where ɛ is the residual from the following expanded market model regression:
r j,t= α +β1jr m, t-1+β2j rm,t+ β3j rm,t+1 + β4j ri,t-1+ β5j ri,t + β6j ri,t +1+ ɛji ,
is the future crash incidence, defined as an indicator variable that equals to 1 for a firm-year that experiences
one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviation below the mean firm-specific weekly
returns over the fiscal year, following prior literature (Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al.(2010ab), Kim and Zhang
(2014), etc).
is the current year negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, defined similarly as Crash2t+1.
is the standard deviation of the firm-specific-weekly return over the fiscal year period.
is the mean of the firm-specific-weekly return over the fiscal year period.
is the negative skewness of future firm-specific-weekly return over the fiscal year period, calculated in the
following equation
Crash2j,t+1=-[n(n-1)3/2ƩW3 j,t+1]/[(n-1)(n-2)( ƩW2jt+1)3/2]
where n is the number of firm-specific weekly returns in a year, and W is the firm-spcific weekly return.
is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of down-week to up-week firm-specific returns.
 is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year period, minus average monthly share
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Appendix B Replication of Bamber et al. (2010)	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Sample Selection Steps CFO CEO Total Observations
ExecuComp 6,754 6,898 44,118
Switching Managers 576 759 20,728
438 460 8,674
325 283 6,119
This table presents the sample selection in constructing manager fixed effects model on firm's frequency of annual earnings
forecasts, i.e. model (8-1) and (8-2).
1.CFOs and CEOs are identified the same way as in section 4. Switching managers are those worked for at least two firms in
the sample period of 1992-2013.
2. In the final estimation sample, there are 325 switching CFOs and 283 switching CEOs whose fixed effects are estimable in
fitting model (8)s. Observations are eliminated from original manager sample due to missing observations in CIG , IBES and
Compustat database during the construction of dependent and control variables.
Data available for managgement earnings forecast in CIG
Data available for control variables calculations using
Compustat and IBES
Table B1 Sample Selection on replicating Bamber et al.(2010) for sample period 1992-2013
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Variables Observations Mean Stdev. 5% 50% 95%
NumF 7,275 4.971 3.910 1.000 4.000 13.000
NumForcann 7,275 2.815 2.845 0.000 2.000 8.000
NumForcq 7,275 2.156 2.456 0.000 1.000 7.000
Size 7,275 7.666 1.499 5.312 7.596 10.207
Leverage 7,275 0.087 0.168 0.000 0.034 0.419
Abs_EPSChg 7,275 0.007 0.139 -0.136 0.006 0.132
ROA 7,275 0.155 0.115 0.012 0.142 0.348
Growth 7,275 0.104 0.271 -0.202 0.072 0.481
OpCF 7,275 0.101 0.084 -0.010 0.097 0.235
EPS_UP 7,275 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000
LOSS 7,275 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 1.000
MB 7,275 3.016 23.595 0.709 2.212 8.586
RDxp 7,275 0.036 0.059 0.000 0.005 0.152
Num_Analyst 7,275 16.707 10.598 4.000 14.000 37.000
DispForecast 7,275 0.267 1.166 0.013 0.071 0.824
F-horizon 7,275 0.555 0.319 0.000 0.564 1.081
1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% level both sides.
2. This table presents descriptive statistics for dependent and independnet variables for the combined CEO and
CFO sample (7,275), with 3,891 from CFO sample and 3,384 from CEO sample
Table B2. Descriptive Statistics of variables used in Bamber et al (2010) replication model
(CEO and CFO sample combined)
This table presents the descriptive statistics of crash risk measures and control variables in manager's fixed
effect model. This sample is the combination of CEO and CFO manager firm-years in the sample period of
1992-2013.
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Economic
determinants
Economic
determinants
and CFO fixed
effect
Economic
determinants and
CEO fixed effect
CEO/CFO=824 CFO=413 CEO=411
D.V.: Number of Forecast per year N= 7,275 N=3,891 N=3,384
Testing Economic Determinatns = 0
F-statistics  27.75*** 12.41*** 9.96***
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constraints F( 13,  6342)  F( 13,  2897)  F( 13,  2546)
Testing Manager Fixed Effect = 0
F-statistics 1.62*** 1.96***
p value 0.000 0.000
Constraints     F(325,  2897) F(283,  2546)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes
Firm fixed Effect yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 15.86% 16.71% 20.37%
Improvement in R2 relative to
restricted model
In Raw Percentage 0.85% 4.51%
As a % of restricted model R2 5.36% 21.90%
2. Definitions of variables in the model can be found in Appendix A.
3. I use the "xtreg, fe" command in Stata for all tests to control for firm fixed-effect.
5. Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 and <0.01 is denoted as *, ** and ***.
1.This table presents the results from model (12) and (13).  I report the F-statisitc of testing the whether coefficeints of the
economic determinants are jointly zero, and whether the coefficients of switching CFO dummies are jointly zero for hypothesis 1.
F-statsitics is the value from this coefficient testing, and a p-value smaller than 0.1 indicates there is CFO fixed effect on firm
crash risk.
Table B3. Replication of Table 3 of Bamber et al.(2010)
Testing individual CFO/CEO fixed effect on forecast frequency
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Table B4.  Table 2 of Bamber et al. (2010) on top managers' fixed effects on the Number of 
Management Earnings Forecasts 
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